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it is rational to believe that God does not exist and not rational to believe
that God does exist. In the book we don't find how to sort this out. My
guess is that Gellman would insist that atheism is not strongly rational;
and that is OK, but he hasn't given us sufficient reason for thinking that
theism is strongly rational and atheism is not. He claims to have shown
that it is not reasonable to believe that God does not exist (p. 3), but I did
not find an argument for that in his book. Gellman also does not
address what I think is an important question concerning his position. If
not everyone perceives God, wouldn't those who do perceive God be in
a different position epistemically from those who do not? I think that
the best we get from Gellman is an argument for something which is a
bit stronger than what he calls the "weak rationality" of theism; namely,
that on some application of the canons of rationality it is rational to
believe that God exists. This, I believe, he has shown, and in a new and
insightful way. He would have to provide much more for us to be able
to see the stronger conclusion. I look forward to his future efforts in that
direction.
NOTES
1. Principle BEE: If a person, S, has an experience, E, which seems (phenomenally) to be of a particular object, 0 (or an object of kind, K), then
everything else being equal the best explanation of S's having E is that S has
experienced 0 (or an object of kind, K), rather than something else or nothing at all (p. 46).
2. Principle STING: If a person,S, has an experience, E, which seems
(phenomenally) to be of a particular object, 0 (or of an object of kind, K),
then our belief that S's having experienced 0 (or an object of kind K) is the
best explanation (everything else being equal) of E, is strengthened in proportion to the number of purported experiences of 0 there are and in proportion to the variability of circumstances in which such experiences occur
(pp. 52-53).

Religion and Contemporary Liberalism edited by Paul J. Weithman.
University of Notre Dame Press, 1997. Pp. viii and 315. $48.00 (cloth)
PETER L.P. SIMPSON, City University of New York
This book consists of a collection of essays by a distinguished cast of
contemporary scholars. The essays are, in order: an introduction by Paul
Weith man on Religion and the Liberalism of Reasoned Respect; Robert
Audi on the State, the Church, and the Citizen; Sanford Levinson on
what Liberalism demands of the Religiously Oriented Judge; Martha
Nussbaum on Religion and Women's Human Rights; Philip Quinn on
Political Liberalisms and the Exclusion of the Religious; Nicholas
W olterstorff on rejecting what Liberalism tells us about Speaking and
Acting in Public for Religious Reasons; Timothy Jackson on Liberal
Theory and Religious Pluralism; Jorge Garcia on Liberal Theory, Human
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Freedom, and the Politics of Sexual Morality; Jean Bethke Elshtain on the
Question Concerning Authority; John Coleman on Deprivatizing
Religion and Revitalizing Citizenship; David Hollenbach on Politically
Active Churches and Some Empirical Prolegomena to a Normative
Approach.
These essays were originally given as papers at a conference on the
topic of religion and contemporary liberalism at the University of Notre
Dame in 1995. The book is, therefore, in the words of the editor in his
introduction, the "proceedings" of that conference. One immediate merit
that the book has as a result is that its contents have a fairly clear unity
and fit together rather nicely. Indeed the book has something of the
character of a single process of argument tending towards a single conclusion. The conclusion is that secular or a-religious liberalism is erroneous, incoherent, even dangerous, and that, properly understood, liberalism needs religion to flourish and survive. The resulting moral (implicit rather than explicit) is that liberal states should do much to encourage
religious practice and belief. This conclusion and moral are, of course,
not shared by all the essayists; in fact Audi and Nussbaum argue for the
opposite conclusion and moral. But the criticism mounted against them
on the other side is collectively overwhelming. Moreover this criticism
rests not merely on philosophical analysis and argument but also on
empirical research. For one of the features of these essays is that they do
not just come from philosophers and theologians, but also from lawyers
and sociologists. It is instructive to have in one volume, alongside philosophical argumentation, some statement and discussion of relevant legal
practice and sociological data.
The book begins with a comprehensive introduction by the editor,
Paul Weithman, who usefully isolates the theme of the book, gives an
overview of each of the essays, brings together the results of the discussion, and ends by suggesting where the discussion might go from here.
This introduction, which is in fact longer than several of the essays, is
well worth having, but most of it is probably better read last than first. It
is more of an essay in its own right and even a continuation of the book
than an introduction to it. Perhaps indeed most of it should have come
at the end and a briefer introduction taken its place at the beginning.
At all events, the main subject of discussion in the book is characterized by Weithman as the "liberalism of reasoned respect." This characterization proves, by the end of the book, to be not a little ironic. For several of the essays argue in effect, as indeed does Weithman himself in his
introduction, that the liberalism in question is not particularly reasonable nor particularly respectful. What is distinctive about it, as
Weithman explains, is that it attempts to found political arrangements
only on such principles and values as all citizens can reasonably respect.
Religious principles and values are not, therefore, going to be allowed
by this liberalism to form the foundation of sQciety or to be appealed to
in political discourse about basic matters of justice and rule. For, given
the pluralism of the modern world, religious principles are, it is alleged,
unlikely to be such as all citizens can reasonably respect.
This sort of liberalism is, of course, especially associated with the
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work of John Rawls. Rawls is indeed much discussed (and criticized) in
this collection, but the liberalism of reasoned respect is presented and
defended in it by Robert Audi. Audi's essay, therefore, suitably comes
first after the introduction. The liberalism of reasoned respect, argues
Audi, imposes quite definite restrictions on appeals to religion in public
discourse. Specifically it requires that, where laws or policies restrictive
of human conduct are concerned, one should refrain from advocating
any such laws and policies unless, in addition to whatever religious reasons one has, one also has, and can present, adequate secular reasons,
and unless one is sufficiently motivated by secular reasons. In arguing
thus Audi is more anti-religious than Rawls. For Rawls would not
require that a religious person be motivated by secular reasons; he thinks
it enough that there should be such reasons and that the religious person
should be ready, if necessary, to present these reasons in arguing publicly for his case. Rawls would also, unlike Audi, put comprehensive secular reasons on the same level as religious reasons and rule out appeal
to both in the advocacy of laws and policies if those reasons could not
reasonably be respected by all citizens. For what matters for Rawls is
that one should conform to the requirements of public reason, not to
those of Audi's secular reason. So, for instance, Audi's position would
allow one to appeal to utilitarianism in one's advocacy of certain restrictive laws but not to Christianity, while Rawls' position would reject
appeal to both. Philip Quinn in his essay is quick to point out the unfairness of this position of Audi's: the religious are penalized but no one
else is who holds controversial views (and utilitarianism is as controversial in liberal societies as religion).
Still, even Rawls would exclude appeal to religious reasons in some
cases, namely those where no reasons acceptable to the non-religious
were also forthcoming. The liberalism of reasoned respect is thus committed, as several of the essayists point out, to imposing a sort of "gagrule" on religious discourse in public life. Instead of such "exclusivist"
liberalism Quinn would prefer an "inclusivist" one. So also would
Sanford Levinson. Both argue, by instructive appeals to legal theorists
and to legal practice, that liberalism can and should give everyone an
equal right to argue on the basis of any controversial belief, whether religious or non-religious (Levinson does, it is true, think that judges in particular are required to exercise some restraint in this regard, though,
unlike Audi and Rawls, he does not wish to lay down any absolute rules
on the question). Those who are not persuaded by argument based on
controversial beliefs will not suffer any infringement of rights (since no
one is being forced to accept what others say). Indeed listening to the
widely different views of others can be an enlightening experience, even
if one is not persuaded-and more so if one is. To deny this or to try to
prevent the presentation of controversial beliefs in public is to go against
J.S. Mill's argument that discovery of truth requires the free exchange of
all opinions, controversial, offensive, or not. It is surely ironic that modem liberals like Rawls and Audi should, in their professed concern for
freedom, end up arguing down Mill himself.
Nicholas Wolterstorff is harder against the liberalism of reasoned
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respect than Quinn or Levinson. The fear of religious wars that liberals
evince and which they often use in arguing for liberalism (as Rawls does
in particular) is, he says, outmoded. Maybe that fear was legitimate in the
seventeenth century, but now our fear should be of secularism, which is
what in fact has been behind the slaughter, torture, and brutality of our
present century. Religion by contrast has been behind most of the
reforms and revolutions that liberals profess to admire. Even in the seventeenth century, Wolterstorff points out, liberalism was not in fact secular, as is evident in Locke. It has not been secular in the American tradition either. Secular liberalism (as one might better call the liberalism of
reasoned respect) is a very recent and very dubious invention and is itself
as controversial, if not more controversial, than religious belief. The
silencing of religion in the public square has, says Wolterstorff, led to a
debasement of public life and discourse to private and group egoisms.
Timothy Jackson takes up the same theme of judging secular liberalism by its fruits and finds it similarly wanting. He proposes instead a
perfectionist and Christian liberalism, as he calls it, developed in part by
appeal to ideas found in Origen and Aquinas. Jackson discovers in these
authors the openness to pluralism and difference that secular liberals
profess to admire, but in them this openness is based precisely on the sort
of religious convictions that secular liberals would be required by their
theory to banish from the public square. The religious convictions in
question are about the infinite transcendence of God's goodness, which,
while a unity in itself, requires an endless plurality of individual things
in order to be mirrored; about God's creation of precisely such a plurality
of individuals; and about the profound respect and love that is therefore
due to that plurality. Love of the individual, which is integral to any liberalism, is more securely rooted in religion than in its opposite. Besides,
argues Jackson, Rawls' liberalism in particular is self-referentially inconsistent (while the religious liberalism advocated by Jackson himself is
not). Since Rawls' theory is itself enormously controversial it cannot itself
pass the demands of public reason that it seeks to impose on religion. By
his own criterion Rawls ought not to advocate his own theory in public.
Jorge Garcia focuses his attack on recent work defending rights to
sexual freedom by Thomas Nagel. These rights too, like Rawls' theory,
are latecomers on the scene and have no precedent in previous liberal
understandings of rights. Garcia pointedly calls them the "liberties of
the Baby Boomers./I Nagel, as spokesman for these liberties, seems to
want a thousand sexual fantasies and experiments to bloom more or less
without restriction but he fails, contends Garcia, to consider just what
the consequences are likely to be. If sexual fantasy and experimentation
are allowed to run free will this lead to more respect for others and in
particular for women? Will it lead to less harassment, less victimization,
less rape? Sex is a powerful passion that has indeed its place in human
life but only where the possibilities for abuse can be controlled and minimized. That place is marriage and not Nagel's fantastic experiments.
Pope John Paul II, like Nagel, also sees sex as expressive, as Garcia
points out, but as expressive of familial love, not fantasy, and as existing
between persons who, whether young or old, are all equally made in the
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image of God. Which is the more human view? Which is more likely to
foster respect for persons and thereby to form the basis for a stable, just
society? Moreover, continues Garcia, if it is some underlying consensus
that, following Rawls, we must look for, are we not more likely to find it
in the religions that already now dominate contemporary life and that
see all men as made in the image of God than in the elaborately argued
and little agreed-on theories of academic philosophers?
That we need religious faith to shore up our democratic institutions is
argued also by Jean Bethke Elshtain. Our present age, she notes, is losing
faith in democracy and secular liberals tell us that the cure is to remove
religious faith from the center of democracy. The truth is the reverse.
Democracy can only survive and avoid collapse into anarchy or tyranny,
or both, if people believe in democracy and willingly submit themselves
and their free action to the authority of democratic principles. It is religious faith that has historically educated people to accept democratic
authority and democratic discipline. Elshtain appositely appeals to de
Tocqueville in support. She could have as easily and as appositely
appealed to George Washington or any of the Founding Fathers, who
were all keenly aware of the dependence of free institutions on religious
belief and who regularly appealed to such belief in their public discourse. It is interesting to speculate how much of Washington's public
career would have been curtailed if Audi and Rawls had been around at
the time to impose on him their respective "gag-rules." The words "so
help me God," for instance, which presidents now say as the final part of
their oath of office were not there when Washington first took the oath.
He added them spontaneously himself and everyone has followed suit
since-and rightly too.
What the other essayists argue about religion and liberalism by appeal
to reason, the final two, John Coleman and David Hollenbach, argue by
appeal also to recent empirical research. Both show the considerable
extent to which healthy democratic practices, above all people's active
participation in the political process, depend in fact on churches and
church-attendance. It is curious that such research has not entered into the
reasonings of secular liberals, for since their claim is in large part an
empirical one (that secularism is necessary for making democracy healthy
and stable) they ought to consider whether the empirical evidence supports that claim. Coleman and Hollenbach show that it does not.
Secular liberalism professes to be a neutral arbitrator between comprehensive and rival visions of the good life. It is a neutral arbitrator
because, as its proponents claim, it is not itself such a comprehensive
vision. But in fact, of course, as many of the essayists point out, it is such
a comprehensive vision. What differentiates it from other visions is that
it tries in its rhetoric to hide the fact while they do not. Secular liberalism
is a sort of wolf in sheep's clothing. This is made particularly clear by
Martha Nussbaum. Her essay is rich in stories about the way religion
has allegedly been used to oppress women. Some of these stories are
indeed poignant, even tragic. They are, however, one-sided. Nussbaum
tells us nothing about the many ways religion has improved the lot of
women nor about the many ways liberalism is now itself oppressing
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women. Cases in point are divorce, contraception, and abortion (which
in their effects, to say nothing of their nature, are disproportionately
damaging to women). Nussbaum appeals to the words of John Paul II to
support her views about freedom but she ignores his words about the
evils of divorce, contraception, and abortion. In fact, in the case of contraception, she wants to stop the Pope and religious authorities generally from publicly speaking out against it. For contraception, she says, is a
basic human right for women and any religious leader who speaks in
public fora against it should be criticized as a "subverter of the constitution" (she does not say this about those who speak against abortion, but
only, it seems, because some third world feminists speak against it).
Nussbaum seems almost to be biting her tongue when she writes thus.
From the general tone of her remarks one might rather think she was
about to preach an anti-religious crusade or jihad.
Most of the essayists in this collection go after Rawls and / or Audi.
Nussbaum is left untouched, which is curious for she is more open and
up-front about what secular liberalism entails in practice than either of
them. She makes it more explicit that secular liberalism is both a comprehensive doctrine and a novel doctrine, and a doctrine moreover that
is going to oppress religion and the religious whenever it feels itself
strong enough to do so. She makes it clearer, therefore, that secular liberals are the enemies of liberty that George Washington warned us against
in his Farewell Address. Fortunately for the vast majority of Americans
secular liberals are a minority voice in the country, and indeed in academia too. But this book is a timely reminder of the threat they pose. In
this, as in other respects, it is a welcome contribution to the important
discussion now going on about freedom and religion, about their relations and interdependence.

Unsnarling the World-Knot: Consciousness, Freedom, and the Mind-Body
Problem. David Ray Griffin. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London:
California University Press, 1998. Pp. xv and 266. $45.00 (Cloth).
LEEMON McHENRY, Loyola Marymount University
Ever since Descartes failed to answer the persistent but insightful questions of Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia as to how the mind and body
interact in the pineal gland of the brain, philosophy has been left with
what Schopenhauer called the "world-knot," arguably the problem of
modern philosophy. The sophistication of neuroscience and computer
models of the brain in the past twenty-five years has certainly stimulated interest in the problem, but emerging scientific orthodoxy has been
one-sided. Physicalistic materialism appears to be the only serious alternative to Cartesian dualism mainly because, according to Griffin, it is the
paradigm of both wishful and fearful thinking: "wishful" to the extent
that we believe what we want to be true-in this case, that all phenomena in the universe will be explained finally by materialistic laws; "fear-

